Category Archives: Events

Welcome New Lab Member

We are excited to have Elena Gelibter join our group.

Elena has a background in both fMRI and MEG, and will be performing research that follows up on our recent review article on eating networks in the brain.  Specifically, Elena’s work aims to better establish the ventral reward and dorsal control pathways associated with  processing of food cues, and to assess a variety of issues associated with their use in  food choices.  Further details about Elena can be found here.

Welcome!  It’s great to have another talented researchers in our group, as we develop new research programmes here in Glasgow.

Three New Articles Not So Obviously On Conceptual Processing

Because conceptual processing supports all intelligent activity , something can  be learned about it from studying just about anything. Just pick your favorite topics, look for conceptual processing, and it’s probably there, taking myriad interesting forms. In this spirit, three new articles examine the processes underlying social priming, eating, and contemplative practices. Although it may not always be obvious how conceptual processing is relevant, trust me, it’s there.

Researchers often complain that there are no theories of social priming (assuming that they are first convinced  it exists, which it obviously does). The theory of situated conceptualization offers an account of social priming, proposing that it  reflects the basic process of multimodal pattern completion inferences  operating throughout cognition. Conceptual processing enters in via the contruct of situated conceptualization from grounded cognition, which assumes that conceptual knowledge about situations produces  inferences to guide intelligent action. From this perspective, social priming reflects the use of past situational experience to guide perception, cognition, affect, and action in current situations.

In our literature review of neuroimaging articles on eating and food cues with Jing Chen as the lead author, food concepts can be seen as  implicit representations of what it’s like to consume specific foods, together with the activities and outcomes of doing so.  We argue that a core eating network–consisting of a ventral reward pathway and a dorsal control pathway–underlies diverse eating phenomena, associated with various eating situations and populations. If you read between the lines, perhaps you’ll see the theme that how you conceptualize food determines how you eat (especially in the section on eating goals, but elsewhere as well).

Perhaps the relevance of conceptual processing is least evident in the article on viewing contemplative practices from the perspective of dual-process theories. Again, though, if you read between the lines, it’s everywhere. On the one hand, conceptualizations inhabit the  habitual implicit responses that occur ubiquitously to perceived stimuli. Indeed, the initial conceptual interpretation of a stimulus typically dominates a person’s affective and behavioral responses to it, sometimes creating dysfunctional mental and physical outcomes. On the other hand, conceptual processes are central to understanding, reappraising, and changing how the mind interprets experience. In other words, reconceptualizing experience is central to successful self-regulation. This article illustrates the rich interplay between dual-process theories and Buddhist contemplative practices, and the potentially productive synergy that results from viewing them together.

If you’re interested in exploring any of these articles further,  the references,  abstracts, and links to them follow.

Barsalou, L.W. (2016). Situated conceptualization offers a theoretical account of social priming. Current Opinion in Psychology, 12, 6-11.

The theory of situated conceptualization is introduced, including its core assumptions about the construction and storage of situated conceptualizations, the production of pattern completion inferences in relevant situations, and the implementation of these inferences via multimodal simulation.  The broad applicability of the theory to many phenomena is reviewed, as is its ability to explain individual differences.  The theory is then applied to social priming, showing that the theory provides a natural account of the diverse forms it takes.  The theory also explains why social priming is difficult to define, why it often reflects modulating factors, and why it can be difficult to replicate.  The importance of studying pattern completion inferences in the context of meaningful situated action receives emphasi

Chen, J., Papies, E.K., & Barsalou, L.W. (2016). A core eating network and its modulations underlie diverse eating phenomena. Brain and Cognition, 110, 20-42.

We propose that a core eating network and its modulations account for what is currently known about the neural activity underlying a wide range of eating phenomena in humans.  The core eating network is closely adapted from a network that Kaye, Fudge, and Paulus (2009) proposed to explain the neurocircuitry of eating, including a ventral reward pathway and a dorsal control pathway.  In a review across multiple literatures that focuses on experiments using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), we first show that neural responses to food cues, such as food pictures, utilize the same core eating network as eating.  Consistent with the theoretical perspective of grounded cognition, food cues activate eating simulations that produce reward predictions about a perceived food and potentially motivate its consumption.  Reviewing additional literatures, we then illustrate how various factors modulate the core eating network, increasing and/or decreasing activity in subsets of its neural areas.  These modulating factors include food significance (palatability, hunger), body mass index (BMI, overweight/obesity), eating disorders (anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, binge eating), and various eating goals (losing weight, hedonic pleasure, healthy living).  By viewing all these phenomena as modulating a core eating network, it becomes possible to understand how they are related to one another within this common theoretical framework.  Finally, we discuss future directions for better establishing the core eating network, its modulations, and their implications for behavior.

Barsalou, L.W. (in press). Understanding contemplative practices from the perspective of dual-process theories.  In J.C. Karremans & E.K. Papies (Eds.), Mindfulness in social psychology. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.

After briefly reviewing the history of dual-process theories in cognitive and social psychology, this chapter explores implications of the dual-process perspective for Buddhist contemplative practices, including mindfulness.  On the one hand, the impulsive and habitual processes in dual-process theories offer a natural account of the phenomena that contemplative practices address (e.g., craving, negative emotion, self-interest, mind wandering).  On the other hand, the regulatory and reflective processes in dual-process theories offer insightful perspective into how contemplative practices modulate these phenomena.  Additionally, dual-process theories offer useful accounts of the constant interplay between habitual and regulatory processing in everyday life, and how contemplative practices establish healthy new cognitive, affective, and behavioral habits that replace less healthy well-entrenched ones.  In turn, contemplative practices—especially the collection of Buddhist practices known as the Eight-Fold Path—provide insight into the nature of habitual processing, and offer provocative ideas for developing interventions to change it.

Four New Articles on Conceptual Processing

If you follow research on conceptual processing from the grounded perspective, four recent articles in press might be of interest.  The first article addresses the debate between grounded and amodal theories, concluding that a successful theory of concepts will include grounding, abstraction, and context-dependent flexibility, while explaining classic conceptual phenomena and making contact with real-world situations.  The second article asks whether human cognition can be reduced to action, and concludes that it can’t, because  diverse representational and other internal processes mediate perception and action, making the impressive range of human actions possible.  The third article presents a theory of situated conceptual processing and demonstrates its broad applicability to cognitive, social, affective, and appetitive behaviors.  The fourth article raises issues for theories of concept composition, arguing that if these theories aspire to psychological plausibility,  they will have to address the content variability, multiple representational forms, and pragmatic  constraint that characterize human conceptual processing.  If you’re interested in exploring any of these articles further,  the references,  abstracts, and links to them follow.

Barsalou, L.W. (2016). On staying grounded and avoiding Quixotic dead ends. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 1122-1142.

The fifteen articles in this special issue on The Representation of Concepts illustrate the rich variety of theoretical positions and supporting research that characterize the area.  Although much agreement exists among contributors, much disagreement exists as well, especially about the roles of grounding and abstraction in conceptual processing.  I first review theoretical approaches raised in these articles that I believe are Quixotic dead ends, namely, approaches that are principled and inspired but likely to fail.  In the process, I review various theories of amodal symbols, their distortions of grounded theories, and fallacies in the evidence used to support them.  Incorporating further contributions across articles, I then sketch a theoretical approach that I believe is likely to be successful, which includes grounding, abstraction, flexibility, explaining classic conceptual phenomena, and making contact with real-world situations.  This account further proposes that (1) a key element of grounding is neural reuse, (2) abstraction takes the forms of multimodal compression, distilled abstraction, and distributed linguistic representation (but not amodal symbols), and (3) flexible context-dependent representations are a hallmark of conceptual processing.

Barsalou, L.W. (2016). Can cognition be reduced to action? Processes that mediate stimuli and responses make human action possible. In A. K. Engel, K. J. Friston, & D. Kragic (Eds.), Where’s the action? The pragmatic turn in cognitive science (Strüngmann Forum Reports, Vol. 18, pp. 81-96, J. Lupp, Series Ed.). Cambridge, MA. MIT Press.

After treating action as peripheral for decades, cognitive scientists increasingly appreciate the fundamental roles it plays throughout cognition.  Because action shapes cognitive processes pervasively, some theorists propose that cognition can be reduced to action.  I propose that the central roles of action in human cognition depend on important processes that mediate between stimuli and responses.  From this perspective, the unique features of human cognition do not simply reflect a remarkable potential for action, but also powerful abilities that mediate action in response to the environment.  Sophisticated action results from sophisticated mediation, in particular, from mediating processes associated with representation, conceptualization, internal state attribution, affect, and self-regulation.  Integrated with action systems, these mediating processes endow humans with unusually flexible and powerful means of shaping their physical and social environments.  Without taking these mediating processes into account, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to explain human action.  It may also be difficult to explain basic cognitive phenomena associated with memory, concepts, categorization, symbolic operations, language, problem solving, decision making, motivation, emotion, reward, self, mentalizing, and social cognition.  Instead of reducing cognition to action, an alternative project is to develop a viable theory that does justice to the importance of action in cognition, while integrating mediating processes that complement it.

Barsalou, L.W. (2016). Situated conceptualization: Theory and applications. In Y. Coello & M. H. Fischer (Eds.), Foundations of embodied cognition, Volume 1: Perceptual and emotional embodiment (pp. 11-37). East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press.

This chapter develops the construct of situated conceptualization beyond earlier treatments.  After assumptions about conceptual processing and grounded cognition are addressed, a theoretical framework for situated conceptualization is presented that incorporates simulation, situatedness, local vs. global conceptualization, exemplars vs. abstraction, emergence, pattern completion inferences, and subjective realism.  The broad applicability of this framework is then illustrated using examples of relevant phenomena from the domains of perception, action, cognition, social cognition, affective processing, and appetitive processing.  As these examples illustrate, the processes of constructing situated conceptualizations, storing them, and applying them in new situations appear to be ubiquitous across domains.  These processes offer a natural means of explaining individual differences across domains as well.

Barsalou, L.W. (in press). Cognitively plausible theories of concept composition. In Y. Winter & J. A. Hampton (Eds.), Compositionality and concepts in linguistics and psychology. London: Springer Publishing.

If a theory of conceptual combination aspires to psychological plausibility, it may first need to address several preliminary issues, all of them relatively daunting.  One issue concerns the considerable variability in a concept’s content.  Increasing research suggests that many, if not most, concepts do not have stable cores that remain invariant across situations.  Instead, concepts generally appear to take different forms across situations, sampling dynamically from diverse sources of information.  Across these different forms, no single prototype (much less a rule) may represent a concept.  Instead, many different situation-specific prototypes or exemplars may represent the concept, with important conceptual content distributed across all these representations in the aggregate.  A second issue concerns the form of a concept’s representation.  Although amodal symbols have traditionally been assumed to represent concepts, their plausibility has been increasingly called into question, with challenges from neural nets, grounded cognition, and latent semantic analysis.  Whereas some researchers argue that simulations in the brain’s modal systems represent concepts, others argue that clouds of linguistic forms play this role.  It would not be surprising if all these accounts are correct to some extent, with concepts being represented in multiple forms, each playing important roles.  A final issue concerns relations between concepts and the world.  As concepts become mapped to their instantiations in the environment, they appear to change and evolve with the extensional feedback that results.  Similarly, as concepts operate in the context of situated action, they acquire goal-relevant properties that support effective goal achievement.  Concepts appear to reflect pragmatic constraints as much as they do semantic and logical ones.  These three issues—content variability, multiple representational forms, and pragmatic constraint—appear central to naturally occurring human concepts.  Not only does each issue constitute a significant challenge for explaining individual concepts, together they pose an even more significant challenge for theories of conceptual combination.  How do concepts combine as their content changes, as different representational forms become active, and as pragmatic constraints shape processing?  Arguably, concepts are most ubiquitous and important in combination, relative to isolation.  Indeed, entering into combinations may play central roles in producing the changes in content, form, and pragmatic relevance observed for individual concepts.  Developing a theory of conceptual combination that embraces and illuminates these issues would not only constitute a significant contribution to the study of concepts, it would also provide insight into the nature of human cognition.

 

Post Doctoral Position Available

University of Glasgow

College of Science and Engineering

Institute of Neuroscience & Psychology / School of Psychology

Research Assistant / Associate

Ref: 012552

Salary: Grade 6/7, £27,328-£30,738/£33,574- £37,768 per annum

 The holder of this post will contribute to a three-year project with Professor Lawrence Barsalou on The Neural Bases of Conceptual Processing in Situated Action. Specific issues to be addressed include: How does conceptual knowledge become situated? How does conceptual knowledge produce multi-modal inferences dynamically to support cognition, affect, and behaviour in specific situations? How can individual differences in situated action and conceptual processing be understood within this framework? How can this framework be brought to bear on food concepts, situated eating behaviours, and other affective processes?

The position requires a strong general background in cognitive, social, and/or affective neuroscience, together with excellent fMRI, experimental, and statistical skills. Specifically, the position requires: (1) playing significant roles in the conceptualization and design of fMRI experiments and any related behavioural experiments, (2) playing significant roles in preparing and running these experiments, analysing their results, writing them up for publication, and presenting them at conferences, (3) playing significant roles in developing grant proposals, performing relevant literature reviews, working together with collaborators, and supervising junior lab members.

For more information and to apply online, please refer to:

www.glasgow.ac.uk/jobs (Reference 012552)

The position is also advertised on jobs.ac.uk at:

http://www.jobs.ac.uk/job/AUC775/research-assistant-associate/

Barsalou Lab site: www.barsaloulab.org

Closing date: 20 March 2016

The University has recently been awarded the Athena SWAN Institutional Bronze Award.

The University is committed to equality of opportunity in employment.

The University of Glasgow, charity number SC004401.

The Barsalou Lab has moved!

After 18 wonderful and productive years in the Department of Psychology at Emory University, the Barsalou Lab has moved to the Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology at Glasgow University.  At the moment, we’re still moving in, getting things set up, and becoming oriented to how everything works in a new environment.  We have already begun several projects with Jing Chen, Gillian Jones, and Nils Rickardsson, one being an fMRI project on the neural bases of decentering while processing food cues, and two being behavioral experiments, first, on decentering during disturbing events, and second, on global vs. local processing in abstract and concrete concepts.  A variety of new projects and grant proposals are being developed for research on situated conceptualization, food cognition, affect, the relation between cognition and perception, etc.  We are quite excited to be heading off in new directions related to long-standing themes and interests.

We are finding that The Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology is a rich and supportive environment for developing and performing research.  Not only are there many talented and accomplished world-class researchers here, the infrastructure for performing research is truly impressive and state-of-the art.  Additionaly, a collaborative and helpful spirit is ubiquitous, infusing the Institute’s activities, together with lightness and humor.  Oh yes, and talk about infrastructure, the coffee machine epitomizes the state-of-the-art attitude here.  And the lounge containing it is a continual source of great conversations and ideas.  There are also too many groups to enumerate who meet regularly to discuss reward, MEG, fMRI, sleep, statistics, methods, etc., etc., and also one great talk after another from people passing through.

In the coming months, we plan on recruiting new members to the lab.  If you’re potentially interested, please stay tuned to this announcements page, where any new positions will be posted.  And if you’re an old friend and colleague who happens to be passing through, please stop by and say hello.